In this work we provide a suite of protocols for group key management based on general semigroup actions. Construction of the key is made in a distributed and collaborative way. Examples are provided that may in some cases enhance the security level and communication overheads of previous existing protocols. Security against passive attacks is considered and depends on the hardness of the semigroup action problem in any particular scenario.
Introduction
Traditional cryptographic tools for key exchange may not be useful when the communication process is carried out in a group of nodes or users. There exist several approaches for group key management, which may be divided into three main classes [12] :
• centralized protocols, where a single entity is in charge of controlling the whole group, minimizing storage requirements, computational power on both the client and server side and communication overheads,
• decentralized, where a large group is divided into subgroups in order to avoid concentrating the workload in a single point,
• distributed, where key generation is carried out in a distributed and collaborative way.
Although, as noted above, solving the SAP implies solving the DHSAP, we do not know if both problems are (in general) equivalent, just like in the traditional setting of Diffie-Hellman, where however some equivalence results for particular scenarios are known [6] .
Motivated by the above, our idea is now to define extensions of the semigroup Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to n users, by first generalizing those introduced in [14] and [15] , and then considering other settings, which can feature more favorable characteristics compared to the original protocol. Since the capability of devices is often limited and authentication processes may be difficult to implement in a distributed network, we focus our attention on confidentiality under passive attacks. As in [8] , some non-standard settings are introduced as more general examples, although the hardness of the SAP there may not be proven yet, so the security of the protocols in those cases is conditional on that.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we consider a suite of three protocols for group key management based on one-sided actions. While these naturally extend the results of [14] and [15] , we consider different settings for a general semigroup action. Section 3 considers the security of the preceding protocols against passive attacks, including forward and backward secrecy. Finally, in Section 4, we introduce two protocols based on linear actions, i.e. semigroup actions on other groups satisfying a certain distributivity property. We give two different group key protocols in this setting, one of which runs very efficiently in only two rounds, independently of the number of members in the communicating group.
Throughout this paper we will consider a group of n users, U 1 , . . . , U n , who would like to share a secret element of a finite set S, and G will denote a finite abelian semigroup acting on S.
Group key communication based on one-sided actions
In this section we consider three different extensions of the semigroup DiffieHellman key exchange with different computing requirements and communication overheads, but with possible applications in different cases. They are natural extensions of [14] and [15] . For completeness we report proofs in appendix to show soundness of the schemes.
A sequential key agreement
The first approach to extend the key exchange protocol consists of a sequence of messages, built using pieces of private information, along a chain of users and an analogous second sequence of messages in the opposite way. Therefore every user will send and receive two messages except for the user that initiates the communication and the last user receiving the sequence of messages. The protocol is defined by the following steps.
Protocol 2 (GSAP-1). Users agree on an element s in a finite set S, a finite abelian semigroup G, and a G-action on S given by Φ. For every i = 1, . . . , n, the user U i holds a private element g i ∈ G.
1. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, user U i sends to user U i+1 the message
2. User U n computes Φ(g n , C n−1 ).
A key agreement in broadcast
The following protocol presents a lower communication overhead than GSAP-1. The idea is again to get a first sequence of messages from user U 1 to user U n , but now U n will broadcast a message that allows the rest of the users to recover the common key.
Protocol 3 (GSAP-2). Users agree on an element s in a finite set S, a finite abelian semigroup G, and a G-action Φ on S. For every i = 1, . . . , n, the user U i holds a private element g i ∈ G.
Remark 2.1. It can be observed that the element f n n contained in the broadcast message in step 3 of Protocol GSAP-2, is not needed by any of the users U i , i = 1, . . . , n − 1 to recover the shared key. However, the distribution of this value is required for future rekeying operations, as we will later show.
Examples
a) The two previous protocols are extensions of those introduced in [14] and [15] for the action of the multiplicative semigroup N * on a cyclic group S of order q generated by g, given by Φ(y, g x ) = (g x ) y . It was pointed out that the first protocol presents excessive communication overheads mainly due to both the number of rounds and messages to be sent. Because of this, only the second one, referred to as IKA.1 in [15] , was recommended. However, the first protocol could be interesting on its own when applied to a sensor network whose communications need to be secure and where it should be assessed whether every node is working properly. After user U n receives the message in step 1, the absence of any of the messages (excepting the last one) in the descending chain of rounds would alert that the corresponding sender node is not working or the communication was interrupted. b) In particular, consider a finite field GF (q) and an element g of prime order. The semigroup N * acts on the subgroup g ⊂ GF (q)
c) Let ε be the set of points in an elliptic curve. Then the action Φ : N * × ε → ε given by Φ(n, P ) = nP for every n ∈ N * and every P ∈ ε provides the corresponding versions of the preceding protocols for elliptic curves. In [11] an implementation of the second protocol can be found. d) In [8, Example 5.13 ] the authors illustrate the use of a semiring of order 6 to construct an example of a practical SAP. This was later cryptanalyzed in [16] due not to a general attack, but rather to the structure of this ring. However, we can use the semiring of order 20 given in [8, Example 5.8 ] to analogously define another SAP and its cryptanalysis is still an open question. This shows an example where SAP does not coincide with a traditional DLP on a semigroup and it is applicable to both preceding protocols. e) In [10, Protocol 80 ] the author defines a key exchange protocol whose security is based on the SAP derived from the following semigroup action: let S be a semiring, T a finitely generated additive subsemigroup of S and let End + (T) be its (additive) endomorphisms semigroup. Then the semigroup action that defines the security of this protocol is given by Φ : (S,
Remark 2.2. Many examples of semigroup actions suitable to defining a DiffieHellman type key exchange protocol can be found in [7] . The corresponding SAP is shown to be computationally equivalent to a DLP for some of them.
A key agreement given by a group action
The existence of inverses in the semigroup G acting on the set S can provide a way to agree on a common key with reduced communication overheads. Moreover, computations can be made more equally distributed among the users. We remark that in the protocols given in the two previous sections, these requirements are higher the further away the user is from the one that initialized the protocol.
Thus we assume that G is a group. The protocol is given by the following steps.
Protocol 4 (GSAP-3). Users agree on an element C 0 = s in a finite set S, a finite abelian group G, and a G-action Φ on S. For every i = 1, . . . , n, the user U i holds a private element g i ∈ G.
2. User U n−1 computes C n−1 = Φ(g n−1 , C n−2 ) and broadcasts it to the other users {U 1 , . . . , U n−2 , U n }.
3. User U n computes the element Φ(g n , C n−1 ).
i , C n−1 ) and sends it to user U n .
5. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, user U n computes Φ(g n , D i ) and sends to users
After protocol GSAP-3, the users U 1 , . . . , U n share a common key given
. This follows easily from the commutativity of G and the fact that for every g i , g j ∈ G, i, j = 1, . . . , n and s ∈ S, we get that Φ(
Remark 2.3. As in Protocol GSAP-2, we also point out that the element C n−1 , which is broadcast by U n in step 5 of Protocol GSAP-3, is needed only for future rekeying purposes.
Remark 2.4. Using the action Φ(y, g x ) = (g x ) y for x, y ∈ Z * q , with g a generator of a cyclic group S of order q, we get the third protocol introduced in [14] and [15] and referred to as IKA.2 in CLIQUES [15] . In this case, user U i sends to user U n the message g n−1 j=1,j =i xj , which is computed with the element x −1 i mod q, given that the x i 's are selected either to be coprime with q or, as the authors suggest, q is chosen to be a prime.
An elliptic curve version is clearly also feasible. An implementation in this sense can be found in [11] .
Security of the key agreements and rekeying operations
In [8] it was pointed out that if an adversary is able to solve the SAP, then she will be able to break the two party Diffie-Hellman key exchange, i.e. solve the DHSAP. It is easy to observe that being able to solve the DHSAP allows getting the shared key in all the protocols proposed above.
Proposition 3.1. If an adversary is able to solve the DHSAP, then she can get the shared key in GSAP-1, GSAP-2 and GSAP-3.
Proof. This follows from the fact that the adversary can access the pair of values
The preceding result shows, as could be expected, that the multiparty key exchange protocols do not enhance the security that the corresponding twoparty protocol offers. However, as in [14] and [15] , it is possible to show that increasing the number of messages does not produce any information leakage whenever the corresponding key exchange based on the SAP for two communicating parties is secure. Here we are referring to security against passive attacks; a totally different picture would arise if we assume that the attacker can control communications from and to one or more particular users, see e.g. [13] .
Let X = {g 1 , . . . , g n } be a set of elements of the semigroup G, s an element of a set S and Φ a G-action on S. Let us define the (ordered) set of elements of S
We point out that the messages that any adversary observes in any of the protocols is a subset of V G Φ (s, n, X), and the key that the users agree on is precisely K G Φ (s, n, X). Let us assume now that Φ is a transitive action, i.e., for every pair of elements s, s ′ ∈ S there always exists a g ∈ G such that Φ(g, s) = s ′ . Thus if s ∈ S is a public element, given any two elements in S, s 1 , s 2 , there always exist
. If, given s, s 1 and s 2 , it is not feasible to distinguish s 3 from a random value in polynomial time, then an induction argument like that given in [15, Theorem 1] allows us to show the following result.
Theorem 3.2. Let Φ be a transitive G-action on S. Then the group key that users derive as a result of any of the protocols GSAP-1, GSAP-2 and GSAP-3 is indistinguishable in polynomial time from a random value, given only the values exchanged between users during the protocol, whenever the corresponding Diffie-Hellman protocol induced by Φ for two users satisfies this property.
Another important issue in any group key management is rekeying after the initial key agreement. There exist three different situations that require a rekeying operation. The first is simply due to key caducity and the group of users remains the same. In the other two cases, we may find a new user that wishes to join the group or a user who leaves the group. In both situations it is required that the new (resp. former) user cannot access the former (resp. new) distributed key. In the following lines we describe the procedures as well as their security.
Let us start by considering the protocol GSAP-1 described in Section 2.1. In this case, we could simply require that a new initial key agreement is needed. However, we may shorten the rekeying process, keeping somehow the spirit of the protocol. If rekeying is due to key caducity, then user U n chooses a new private element g ′ n ∈ G and defines a new sequence f n j = Φ(g ′ n g n , C j−1 ), j = 1, . . . , n − 1, with C 0 = s, as is done in step 3 of GSAP-1. The rest of the users also proceed as in step 3 and recover (using their private keys as described in GSAP-1) the new key Φ g ′ n n j=1 g j , s . In case some user, say U i , leaves the group, then the corresponding value f n i is omitted in the new message made by U n .
Finally, in case a user U n+1 joins the group, then user U n chooses a new element g ′ n and sends the message
to user U n+1 . Then this user starts step 3 of GSAP-1.
Security of all new subsequent key distributions follows from Theorem 3.2.
In the case of protocols GSAP-2 and GSAP-3, described in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 respectively, we may use the information that every user holds after the initial key agreement to rekey very efficiently as is suggested in [15] . In this case, given that every user remembers the same information, say 
This user proceeds (in both protocols GSAP-2 and GSAP-3) to step 5 of protocol GSAP-3.
Again, security in every case is a consequence of Theorem 3.2.
Secure group communication based on linear actions
As can be observed in the protocols given in the previous section, user U n plays a central role, and in two of them, every user is required to do a different number of computations and store a different number of values, depending on his proximity to U n . The aim of this section is twofold. On one hand, we give a similar approach to that of GSAP-3 in order to get a protocol with the same advantages that is applicable in situations where the semigroup G acting on S does not contain inverses. On the other hand, we give a new approach based on linear actions that in some cases not only significantly decreases communication overheads, but also reduces the number of rounds to just 2, which will significantly enhance the efficiency.
We say that, given G and S semigroups, an action Φ :
The following protocol is a modification of GSAP-3 for a linear G-action Φ on S, but instead of requiring G to be a group, we require this of S. We get a similar protocol that is also an extension of Diffie-Hellman to the multiparty case.
Protocol 5 (GSAP-3'). Users agree on an element s in a finite group S, a finite abelian semigroup G, and a linear G-action Φ on S. For every i = 1, . . . , n, the user U i holds a private element g i ∈ G.
1. For i = 1, . . . , n − 2, user U i sends to user U i+1 the message C i = Φ(g i , C i−1 ).
4. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, user U i computes D i = Φ(g i , s) −1 C n−1 and sends it to user U n .
5. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, user U n computes Φ(g n , D i ) and sends to users {U 1 , . . . , U n−2 , U n−1 } the set of values {Φ(g n , D 1 ), . . . , Φ(g n , D n−1 ), Φ(g n , D n )} and his public key Φ(g n , s), where D n = Φ(g n , s) −1 C n−1 .
For
Theorem 4.1. After protocol GSAP-3', the users U 1 , . . . , U n share a common
Proof. This follows from the linearity of the action Φ. j=1 xj g −xi . b) If ε is the group of points of an elliptic curve, then ε is a Z-module via the linear action Φ(k, P ) = kP for every k ∈ Z and P ∈ ε. D i assumes the form (
Let us introduce an example where the preceding protocols can be run over a module structure. Let us recall from [2] the following ring:
with addition and multiplication defined, respectively, as follows
Here Mat m×m (Z) denotes the set of m × m matrices with entries in Z, and p r Z p s denotes the set {p r u | u ∈ {0, . . . , p s − 1}} ⊂ Z for positive integers r and s. This ring is clearly non-commutative and its product defines an action of the multiplicative semigroup E Note that our aim in this paper is not to prove the hardness of the SAP for this particular example, but rather to present protocols which rely on the hardness of the SAP in a particular scenario once it has been established there. The non-commutative scenario in particular may present hidden vulnerabilities, as was shown in recent cryptanalyses, e.g. [5, 9] , although these seem not to directly apply in this setting. For example [5] introduces a cryptanalysis for the case of two users when the ring E (m) p acts on itself, which can be countered by choosing p and m appropriately in order to avoid the existence of inverses [2] . In the case of [9] , the cryptanalysis requires building a system of equations, which does not seem to be straightforward in this new setting of Z[M ]. In [7, Proposition 3.9] it is asserted that if the commutative semigroup has a big number of invertible elements, then it is possible to develop a square root attack to the SAP. Again we point out that E (m) p could be chosen in order to avoid this attack.
Given that both Φ n−1 i=1 g i , s and Φ(g n , s) are public we immediately get the following. Let us recall from [8] that given any G-action Φ on S, we can easily define an ElGamal type of public key cryptosystem. We define the following ElGamal type of protocol.
1. Alice and Bob publicly agree on an element s ∈ S.
2. Bob chooses b ∈ G and computes Φ(b, s). Bob's private key is b, his public key is Φ(b, s).
4. Alice chooses randomly a ∈ G and computes Φ(a, s) and Φ(a, Φ(b, s)).
5. Alice sends to Bob the pair (c, d) = Φ(a, s), mΦ(a, Φ(b, s) . Φ(a, s) ) −1 , given that S has a group structure.
Bob recovers
It can be easily observed that solving the DHSAP is equivalent to breaking the preceding algorithm: if given the public information (s, Φ(a, s), Φ(b, s), mΦ(ab, s)) one is able to get m, then the input (s, Φ(a, s), Φ(b, s), e) , for e ∈ S the neutral element, produces Φ(ab, s) −1 , which solves the DHSAP. Conversely, given Bob's public key Φ(b, s) and the pair Φ(a, s), mΦ(a, Φ(b, s)) , one can use Φ(ab, s) from the DHSAP to recover m. Now using the above we are able to show the security of GSAP-3'. Theorem 4.3. The group key that users derive as a result of GSAP-3' is indistinguishable in polynomial time from a random value whenever the corresponding Diffie-Hellman protocol induced by Φ for two users also satisfies this property.
Proof. Given that both
lic, an adversary is able to get all the public values Φ(g i , s), i = 1, . . . , n. Now user U n sends the message {Φ(g n , D i )} n−1 i=1 jointly with Φ(g n , s), in other words, due to linearity of Φ, user U n sends a "a family of pairs", i = 1, . . . , n,
which can be seen as a set of ElGamal encryptions of the message
using the public keys Φ(g i , s), i = 1, . . . , n. Alternatively, one can consider the pairs
which can also be seen, given the commutativity in G, as a set of ElGamal encryptions of the message
using the public key Φ(g n , s −1 ), and the g i 's as random numbers, for i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, as we pointed out above, given the equivalence of the security of the ElGamal type of public key cryptosystem and the DHSAP, the result follows.
The rekeying process in this setting is analogous to that described in Section 3 for protocols GSAP-2 and GSAP-3.
We first note that every user remembers the following keying information.
In case of key caducity, user U c for some c = 1, . . . , n chooses a new element 
g i , s and broadcasts the following message
jointly with the value Φ(g ′ c , Φ(g n , s)). User U c changes his private information to g c g ′ c .
In case rekeying is due to some user leaving the group, then the corresponding value is omitted in the above message.
Finally, let us assume that U n+1 joins the group. The process corresponds in this case to something similar to a "double rekeying"as above. First, U c sends to U n+1
jointly with the value Φ(g ′ c , Φ(g n , s)). Then, U n+1 broadcasts a rekeying message given by
jointly with the value Φ(g n+1 g ′ c g n , s). Security of these processes is shown with a similar argument as in Theorem 4.3.
A more symmetrical use of linear actions is the following protocol, which decreases the number of rounds to just 2, but which is only applicable in some cases.
Protocol 6 (GSAP-4). Users agree on an element s in a finite abelian semigroup S, a finite abelian semigroup G, and a linear G-action Φ on S. For every i = 1, . . . , n, the user U i holds a private element g i ∈ G.
For every
2. For some j = 1, . . . , n, user U j computes and makes public
Φ(g r , s) , i = j, i = 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 4.4. After protocol GSAP-4, the users U 1 , . . . , U n share a common key given by Φ(g j , r =j Φ(g r , s)).
Proof. For every i = 1, . . . , n, i = j,
Example 2. a) Let us consider again a cyclic group S of order q generated by g, with the action Φ :
y . Then GSAP-4 implies sharing a key of the form K = g kj n r=1,r =j kr . An adversary can access the messages
Φ(g r , s) , i = j, i = 1, . . . , n, from which she can compute n r=1,r =j D r = K n−2 . In the case where the order q of S is known, the adversary can now recover the key K from K n−2 by inverting n − 2 modulo q. This is in particular the case where S is a subgroup of a finite field, or where it is the group of points of an elliptic curve. However, we can avoid this weakness by adding some authentication information as is done in [1] . b) Let m = pq with p and q two large primes and let G = Z * (p−1)(q−1) . Then the action Φ : G × Z m → Z m given by Φ(x, g) = g
x mod m shows an example where the above attack cannot be developed unless the adversary is able to factorize m. The shared key in this case is of the form g xj n i=1,i =j xi mod m. c) We recall that a semiring R is a semigroup with respect to both addition and multiplication and the distributive laws hold. It is also understood that a semiring is commutative with respect to addition and the existence of neutral elements is not required, although some authors do require it. Then given a semiring R, a left R-semimodule M is an abelian semigroup with an action Φ : R × M → M , Φ(r, m) = rm, satisfying r(sm) = (rs)m, (r + s)m = rm + sm and r(m + n) = rm + rn for all r, s ∈ R and m, n ∈ M . Thus, based on the previous two examples, we can assert in general that any semimodule S over a semiring R fits with GSAP-4 and the shared key is of the form k j ( n r=1,r =j k r )s for k i ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , n private and s ∈ S public. Remark 4.5. Due to the attack shown in example a), the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem is not enough to show security in this case. We leave it as an open question whether the hardness of factoring would be enough to do so. Remark 4.6. We can also give protocols based on two-sided actions. To this end we recall that given a semiring S, right S-semimodules are defined dually to left ones. Then, given two semirings R and S, an (R, S)-bisemimodule M is both a left R-semimodule and a right S-semimodule such that (rm)s = r(ms) for every r ∈ R, m ∈ M and s ∈ S. Now we are able to provide key exchange protocols similar to those given in the previous sections based on two-sided linear actions over a (R, S)-bisemimodule M . In the case of GSAP-3', since we need the existence of inverses with respect to addition in M , we may suppose that M has an (R, S)-bimodule structure for some rings R and S.
Appendix GSAP1
Theorem 5.1. After protocol GSAP-1, users U 1 , . . . , U n agree on the common key Φ n j=1 g j , s .
Proof. User U n computes Φ(g n , C n−1 ) = Φ g n , Φ Let us show now that the rest of the users recover exactly the same key. For k = 1, . . . , n − 1, user U k computes Φ(g k , f k+1 k ).
It is straightforward to show that for every i = 1, . . . , n−2, j = 1, . . . , n−i−1, the following equality holds: To do so, we will prove that C i+s s = Φ i+s r=1;r =i g r , s for s = 1, . . . , n − 2 and i = 1, . . . , n − s − 1.
Let us make induction on s. For s = 1, we get by definition that C 
